Politics in post-independence Kenya can be divided into three eras, each dominated by a single figure: Jomo Kenyatta (1963–78), Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002) and Raila Odinga (2003–25). Kenyatta, the founding president, forged the postcolonial settlement, struck the related elite bargains, set the contours of economic policy, and placed the country on a path of constitutional stasis. Those who did not fit within the “Kenyatta model” — including Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia and J.M. Kariuki — were swiftly marginalised or eliminated. The echoes of that era still reverberate today.
Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, sought to redistribute power and wealth away from Kenyatta’s circle. His often paranoid style of governance during the economic and political crises of the 1980s and 1990s exacerbated the authoritarian bureaucracy he had inherited. He also reshaped Kenya’s party politics. Although his attempt to turn KANU into a mass party failed, its legacy endures in the personalities and practices that continue to dominate Kenyan politics. The names of the parties may change and coalitions may shift, but the KANU style — and its alumni network — endure.
Raila Odinga never became president. He was widely believed to have been denied victory in 2007 due to electoral malpractice, and came close again in 2022. Yet he defined this era through his central role in the pro-democracy struggles of the 1990s, the constitutional reform movement and the institutionalisation of multiparty politics after Moi. As a long-standing opposition leader equally at ease inside and outside the establishment, he shaped the transitions that followed — influencing the presidencies of Mwai Kibaki, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto.
His death on 15 October 2025, in Kerala, India, aged 80, marks the end of an era. He is survived by his wife, Ida Odinga, their three children, and several grandchildren.
He styled himself as the enigma of Kenyan politics — a mix of idealism and pragmatism
History will struggle to pigeonhole the man who styled himself as the enigma of Kenyan politics. He was a complex mix of idealism and pragmatism. He was the de facto leader of the reformist wing of mainstream politics for decades, yet he was also an establishment figure, willing to engage in transactional ‘handshake’ politics with forces intent on preserving both political power and economic privilege.
Odinga was a master tactician who outmanoeuvred four different presidents. However, his lack of strategic discipline denied him the presidency, even setting aside 2007. He had a strong reformist streak — most notably during the struggle for the 2010 constitution, for which he is widely regarded as the principal architect. But he was also a pragmatic compromiser, willing to cut deals with administrations that later violated that same constitution. He built what is arguably Kenya’s most organisationally coherent party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), but was wary of promoting independent centres of power within his sphere of influence. And for all his rhetoric about a better Kenya, his development record was uneven. Although he represented Kibera, the country’s most famous slum, in parliament, he failed to galvanise counties governed by his party into adopting a coherent developmentalist agenda after 2013.
On balance, history is likely to view Odinga’s contributions positively. His role in dislodging KANU from power, his willingness to step back from the brink after the disputed 2007 elections, his push for the 2010 constitution, his ability to galvanise a truly national movement in the form of ODM, and his position as the mainstream leader of reformist politics will stand the test of time.
Unlike most Kenyan politicians, who are primarily motivated by wealth accumulation, Odinga relished politics for its own sake
Raila Amolo Odinga was born on 7 January 1945 in Maseno to Oginga Odinga, who would later become Kenya’s first vice-president, and his wife Ajuma. He attended Maranda High School before travelling to East Germany to train as an engineer. Alongside Tom Mboya’s more famous airlifts to the West, leftist politicians led by the senior Odinga organised parallel airlifts to the Eastern bloc. When Raila returned in the early 1970s, his father’s political star had dimmed. The Kenya People’s Union party, which Oginga had founded after resigning the vice-presidency, had been banned in 1969, and Luo influence on the national stage had waned. The younger Odinga joined the civil service at the Kenya Bureau of Standards before establishing his own business, which grew into the Spectre group of firms.
His time in East Germany became a recurring subplot in his political career. His detractors labelled him a communist, conveniently ignoring his record as a capitalist entrepreneur in a system where mixing public service with private enterprise was common.
Moi’s rise to the presidency in 1978 briefly restored the Odingas’ fortunes. However, the failed 1982 coup and Raila’s alleged involvement in it cooled relations with the state. This was followed by six years of detention, then a brief exile in Europe. Upon his return, he entered politics under his father’s wing.
Unlike most Kenyan politicians, who are primarily motivated by wealth accumulation, Odinga relished politics for its own sake. Odinga was different; he relished politics for its own sake. He made money and enabled his allies to do the same, but his passion lay in reformist politics. It is no coincidence that he built the only post-KANU party with genuine national appeal.
His politics opened the door to reform, but also to compromise with entrenched interests
That reformist mindset made him a conflicted member of the political establishment. His politics paved the way for ideologically driven mobilisation and populist influence on policy. He was an insider who bargained with his political base, but he could also be constrained by it. This two-way relationship with the masses was a defining yet underappreciated feature of his career. Students admired him. Low-income voters rallied around him. Human rights groups projected their hopes onto him. Intellectuals embraced him. The establishment feared him.
The love was never uniform, nor was it always reciprocated. Many idealists had their hopes dashed by his compromises or the system’s rigidity. Nevertheless, it’s difficult to think of another mainstream politician who embodied the collective national desire for a better Kenya for so long.
His career underscored the limits of electoral politics as a vehicle for structural change. To become a national figure, he had to command an ethnic bloc. That meant fighting for control of FORD-Kenya, his father’s party, and later founding his own. Once established as the Luo kingpin, he could never shed the label, even as he built support well beyond his ethnic base. Ethnic politics thus limited the reach of his reformist message. In 2007, for example, many reformists from the 1990s chose ethnic loyalty over confronting the theft of his victory.
His death revealed what many had never contemplated: Kenyan politics without Raila Odinga
Many voters also struggled to see him as anything other than a Luo politician. While they respected his reformist credentials and pugilistic style, they found reasons not to elect him president. These same voters then criticised him for his ‘handshakes’ with the politicians they had chosen instead.
It was a testament to his political skill and charisma that he was still viewed by many as the consummate outsider, even when he compromised. His willingness to bargain reflected a refusal to be confined to symbolic opposition, not weakness. He wanted to be in the arena.
The void he leaves behind will be hard to fill. Following the announcement of his death, it was interesting to observe that few Kenyans had given much thought to Kenyan politics without Raila Odinga. The implications of his death will be debated for years. For now, the country mourns with the Odinga family. Lala salama, Jakom.
Ken Opalo, Associate professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
This article originally appeared in An Africanist Perspective and is republished here with permission. Read the original article.
